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ABSTRACT 
 
 
For thirty years, dependence on oil has been a significant problem for the United States.  Oil 
dependence is not simply a matter of how much oil we import.  It is a syndrome, a combination 
of the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to higher oil prices and oil price shocks and a 
concentration of world oil supplies in a small group of oil producing states that are willing and 
able to use their market power to influence world oil prices.  Although there are vitally important 
political and military dimensions to the oil dependence problem, this report focuses on its direct 
economic costs.  These costs are the transfer of wealth from the United States to oil producing 
countries, the loss of economic potential due to oil prices elevated above competitive market 
levels, and disruption costs caused by sudden and large oil price movements.  Several 
enhancements have been made to methods used in past studies to estimate these costs, and 
estimates of key parameters have been updated based on the most recent literature.  It is 
estimated that oil dependence has cost the U.S. economy $3.6 trillion (constant 2000 dollars) 
since 1970, with the bulk of the losses occurring between 1979 and 1986.  However, if oil prices 
in 2005 average $35-$45/bbl, as recently predicted by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, oil dependence costs in 2005 will be in the range of $150-$250 billion.  Costs 
are relatively evenly divided between the three components.  A sensitivity analysis reflecting 
uncertainty about all the key parameters required to estimate oil dependence costs suggests that a 
reasonable range of uncertainty for the total costs of U.S. oil dependence over the past 30 years 
is $2-$6 trillion (constant 2000 dollars).  Reckoned in terms of present value using a discount 
rate of 4.5%, the costs of U.S. oil dependence since 1970 are $8 trillion, with a reasonable range 
of uncertainty of $5 to $13 trillion. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This is the fourth in a series of reports on the economic costs to the United States of its 
dependence on petroleum.1  Although there are very important military, strategic and political 
costs of oil dependence (e.g., see Leiby et al., 1995) this series has dealt only with direct 
economic costs because they are relatively well defined, measurable, significant and too 
frequently overlooked.  Through the year 2000, the cumulative costs of oil dependence were 
estimated to be $4 trillion in constant $2000 dollars or $7 trillion if the dollars are converted to 
present value (Greene and Tishchishyna, 2001).  This study updates those cost estimates to 2004, 
introduces some improvements to the estimation methodology, and includes projections for 
2005. 
 
Oil dependence is not simply a matter of how much oil we import.  It is a syndrome, a 
combination of factors that together create economic, political and military problems.  It is 
comprised of the concentration of the world’s oil supply in a small group of oil producing states 
that wield monopoly power, together with the demand-side vulnerability of the U.S. economy to 
higher oil prices and price shocks.  Our vulnerability depends on how much oil we consume, the 
lack of ready substitutes for oil, and also how much we import.  Political, social and religious 
conflicts between the oil producing and consuming nations complicate the economic, strategic 
and military dimensions. 
 
This report updates estimates of historical costs through 2004 and projects costs in 2005 based 
on current oil price projections of the U.S. Energy Information Administration.  Several 
improvements have been made to the cost estimation methods, key parameters have been revised 
based on the recent literature, and risk analysis methods have been used to better reflect the 
inherent uncertainty about critical assumptions.  We find that the costs of oil dependence through 
2004 have been approximately $3.6 trillion in constant year 2000 dollars.  If past costs are 
converted to present value, the costs amount to approximately $8 trillion.  Throughout this 
report, costs will be reported in constant 2000 dollars.  The risk analysis gives a 90% sensitivity 
interval of $2.1 trillion to $6.2 trillion for the reference case assumptions.  The econometric 
literature suggests that the economy’s vulnerability to oil price shocks has not decreased over 
time, an assumption not fully accepted in the reference case.  Assuming a constant oil price 
elasticity of GDP results in higher cost estimates of $3.9 trillion ($8.4 present value).  Sensitivity 
analysis demonstrates that the cost estimates produced by the method used in this study are 
robust to even large changes in key assumptions. 
 
In estimating the economic costs of oil dependence we have not included the real and substantial 
costs to society of policies implemented to deal with the problem.  Chief among such costs are 
military expenditures related to protecting oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and the creation and 
maintenance of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (e.g., see Delucchi, 1996; Leiby et al., 1995; and 
Parry and Darmstadter, 2003 for reviews and discussion of these issues).  Such costs are not 
considered here, not because they are unimportant, but because they are so different by nature 
and with respect to the methodological issues they raise. 
                                                 
1 The three previous reports are: Greene and Leiby, 1993; Greene, Jones and Leiby, 1995; 1998; Greene and 
Tishchishyna, 2001. 
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2.  THE NATURE OF THE OIL DEPENDENCE PROBLEM 
 
 
The United States’ dependence on oil has been a serious national concern since the first oil price 
shock in 1973.  However, even today there is not a consensus on the definition of oil dependence 
and how to measure its economic costs.  The principal reason for this is that the problem of oil 
dependence is not one dimensional.  It is not merely a matter of how much oil is imported, 
although the volume of imports matters.  It is not entirely a matter of how much oil is consumed, 
although that too is important.  The lack of economical substitutes for oil, especially in the 
transportation sector, is also a key element.  The concentration of oil resources in a relatively few 
countries that have demonstrated the desire and capability to influence world oil prices is an 
essential ingredient (Kaufmann et al., 2004).  Oil dependence should be seen as a syndrome, a 
combination of the importance of oil to the economy, reliance on imports, lack of economical 
substitutes, and the use of market power by oil producing states.  These factors have combined to 
cost the U.S. economy trillions of dollars over the past 30 years (Greene and Tishchishyna, 
2001). 
 
Oil is a critical resource for which there are still inadequate substitutes in the economically vital 
transportation sector.  Thirty years after the Arab-OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 the U.S. 
transportation system remains dependent on petroleum for 97% of its energy needs (US 
DOE/EIA, 2004b, table 2.1e).  The U.S. economy is increasingly relying on imported petroleum 
to satisfy its growing demand.  In 1973 net imports of petroleum supplied 35% of total U.S. oil 
consumption.  This grew to 47% in 1977, but increased domestic supply from Alaska and 
reduced domestic demand as a result of higher oil prices and energy efficiency regulations drove 
imports down to 27% of total consumption in 1985.  Since the oil price collapse of 1986, U.S. 
net oil import dependence has gradually risen to 58% (through October 2004).  Net oil imports 
are at their highest levels ever, 11.8 million barrels per day (mmbd).  Record import levels and 
oil spot market prices peaking at $55/bbl (nominal $) will likely lead to near-record expenditures 
on oil imports in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 1). 
 
Importing so much of a critical energy resource would be much less of a problem were it not for 
the fact that so much of the world’s oil supply and oil resources are concentrated in a relatively 
few countries, countries that have demonstrated a willingness to use monopoly power to 
manipulate price (Kaufmann et al., 2004).  According to the economic theory of partial 
monopolies, the market power of the OPEC cartel depends on three key factors (Greene, 1991): 
(1) the cartel’s share of the world oil market, (2) the price elasticity of world oil demand, and 
(3) the price elasticity of non-OPEC oil supply.2  In a dynamic market, market power also 
depends on the rate of growth of oil demand and the rate of change, if any, of non-OPEC supply 
(Greene, Jones and Leiby, 1998). 
  
 
 
                                                 
2 These three factors together determine the net price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil.  For purposes of 
understanding the nature of the oil dependence problem and what may be done about it, it is useful to list them 
separately. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Expenditures on Crude Oil, 1970-2004 (est.) 
 
Comprehensive studies of the economic costs of oil dependence tend to fall into two categories: 
(1) those that treat the economic costs as arising from the use of monopoly power in the world oil 
market (Greene and Leiby, 1993; Greene, Jones and Leiby, 1998; Greene and Tishchishyna, 
2001), and (2) those that treat the costs of oil dependence as external costs, arising from a variety 
of phenomena (Leiby et al., 1995; Delucchi, 1997; Moore, Behrens and Blodgett, 1998; Parry 
and Darmstadter, 2003).  The chief differences between the two approaches are in their diagnosis 
of the nature of the problem and the choice of what to compare the actual situation to.  Studies 
that take the first approach assume that monopoly power is the key market failure and compare 
the actual situation to a hypothetical competitive world oil market or to a market in which 
OPEC’s market power is significantly reduced (e.g., Greene, Jones and Leiby, 1998).  Studies 
that take the second approach assume that failure to internalize external costs in oil prices is the 
key market failure and compare the actual situation to one in which external costs are 
internalized.  Studies of the external costs type generally include a wider array of external costs, 
from greenhouse gas emissions to military costs of securing oil supplies. 
 
Some analysts have confused the two perspectives, arguing that since externalities are market 
failures, and oil dependence reflects a market failure, then oil dependence should be treated as if 
it were an externality.  Not recognizing this as a logical fallacy, the analysts cast oil dependence 
in terms of external costs, estimate the external costs, and then conclude that a tax reflecting 
those external costs represents all that is economically justifiable to deal with oil dependence.  
Referring to the Pigouvian externality tax as a premium, Parry and Darmstadter (2003, p. 2) 
make precisely such a fallacious assertion. 
 
“The premium reflects the extent to which the costs to the United States from an 
extra barrel of petroleum consumption exceeds (sic) the private costs paid by oil 
users; it tells us how much policy intervention to reduce oil dependency is 
warranted on economic grounds through, for example, energy conservation 
measures.”  
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The first part of the assertion is accurate; the authors have attempted to estimate marginal social 
costs of petroleum consumption due to two phenomena: (1) the monopsony power of the United 
States which accounts for 25% of world oil consumption, and (2) the disruption costs of possible 
future oil price shocks.  The second part of the assertion is incorrect, because the market failure 
at the heart of the oil dependence problem is monopoly power on the part of the OPEC cartel not 
the external costs that are byproducts of the competitive market failure.  An oil premium is not a 
solution for the market failure of monopoly power and therefore is not a solution for the 
syndrome of oil dependence, nor does an oil premium fully reflect the economic benefits of 
reducing oil dependence.  Misdiagnosing the problem of oil dependence as an externality leads 
to severely underestimating the importance of oil dependence to our economy and to inadequate 
policy prescriptions. 
 
Others (e.g., Leiby et al., 1995) recognize the importance of the market failure of monopoly 
power in world oil markets but still consider it useful to develop estimates of the marginal social 
cost of oil use due to monopsony power and oil price shocks.  They point out that such estimates 
could be very useful in formulating pricing policies as one component of a comprehensive 
strategy to address the problem of oil dependence.  
 
It should be no surprise that the two different diagnoses lead to different estimation 
methodologies and to very different cost estimates.  For example, OPEC successfully raising 
prices above competitive market levels would be viewed as an economic cost in the first 
approach, but might be considered a successful internalization of external costs and therefore a 
reduction in social costs by the second.  Acknowledging the importance of externalities 
associated with oil use, such as greenhouse gas emissions, the objective of this study is to 
estimate the direct economic costs to the U.S. of the market failure of monopoly power in the 
world oil market.  
 
The two different diagnoses (externality vs. monopoly power) also lead to very different 
conclusions about how to solve the problem of oil dependence.  If oil dependence is an 
externality, the most appropriate policy intervention is to internalize that externality in oil prices, 
e.g., via a tax on petroleum.  But if market power is the problem and breaking up the cartel is not 
an option, the most effective solutions may be largely technological: (1) increasing the range of 
resources that can be economically converted to petroleum fuels, (2) increasing the efficiency of 
petroleum use, and (3) developing economically viable substitutes for petroleum.  Some 
measures, such as strategic reserves to mitigate oil supply disruptions, are appropriate under 
either diagnosis.  Failure to recognize that monopoly power is at the core of the oil dependence 
problem could lead to underinvestment in research and development to produce technological 
solutions. 
 
It is reasonable to ask whether the competitive market comparison is meaningful since it may not 
be possible to achieve a fully competitive world oil market.  Even if a fully competitive market 
cannot be achieved, the hypothetical competitive world oil market remains a useful reference 
point.  It is not necessary to achieve a fully competitive market in order to meaningfully reduce 
the costs of oil dependence.  Economic benefits can be achieved by weakening the market power 
of the OPEC cartel without eliminating it.  In a simulation of the possible future costs of oil 
dependence from 1993-2010, Greene, Jones and Leiby (1998) showed how savings of $0.5 
trillion would accrue to the U.S. economy if the price elasticities of oil supply and demand could 
be doubled by means of advanced technology, despite the continued existence of OPEC.   
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Recent history contains a clear instance of market forces and energy policies undermining 
OPEC’s market power.  The period of high oil prices from 1973-1985 stimulated additional 
supply from non-OPEC countries and encouraged energy efficiency improvements and fuel 
switching.  Policies such as fuel economy standards further reduced the demand for petroleum.3  
Prior to the first oil price shock in 1973-74, world oil consumption had been growing steadily at 
an average annual rate in excess of 7% from 1960 to 1973 (US DOE/EIA, 2004b, table 11.10).  
From 1973 to 1985, world oil consumption fluctuated, ending the 12-year period only 5% higher 
than the 1973 level (an average annual rate of only 0.4% per year).  As a result of the market’s 
response to higher prices and policies requiring energy efficiency improvements, OPEC’s share 
of world crude oil production fell from 55% in 1973 to 30% in 1985 (US DOE/EIA, 2004b, table 
11.5).  The combination of drastically reduced market share and stagnant growth in oil demand 
was sufficient to cause the collapse of OPEC’s market power and the collapse of monopolistic 
oil prices in 1986.  Although OPEC still possessed some market power at a 30% market share, 
steadily shrinking revenues undermined the discipline of OPEC member states causing the 
collapse of the cartel as an effective, partial monopolist.  It took almost 15 years for the OPEC 
cartel to regain a dominant position in the world oil market. 
 
Both the monopoly power and externality methods of analysis can be useful for revealing 
different aspects of the problem.  The externality studies are useful if one is considering how to 
devise fiscal measures to ameliorate the problem of oil dependence.  The monopoly power 
approach to oil dependence is useful for analyzing the benefits of changing the technological 
basis of oil consumption, the benefits of additional oil supplies (such as the disputed resources in 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), or the benefits of regulatory policies, such as energy 
efficiency standards, that reduce petroleum consumption by non-price mechanisms.  It is 
critically important, however, not to confuse externality cost estimates with the full economic 
costs of oil dependence.  Since the oil dependence syndrome depends strongly on the use of 
market power, it is in essence an entirely different kind of market failure from an externality and 
one that cannot be solved, even in theory, solely by adjusting the price of oil.  Likewise, it is not 
possible to estimate the full costs of oil dependence to the U.S. economy by calculating the 
external costs of oil use. 
                                                 
3 Not only did the United States implement mandatory fuel economy standards, but many other developed 
economies implemented voluntary fuel economy standards which were adhered to (Plotkin, Greene and Duleep, 
2002). 
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3.  DEFINITION OF THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF OIL DEPENDENCE 
 
 
3.1  DEFINITION OF OIL DEPENDENCE 
 
Measuring the economic costs of oil dependence requires a rigorous definition of oil dependence.  
Much of the confusion about the costs of oil dependence arises from the fact that it has more than 
one dimension.  Oil dependence is a product of the importance of oil to the U.S. economy, the 
quantity of U.S. oil imports, the inelasticity of world oil demand (particularly in the short run), 
the ability of the OPEC cartel to manipulate oil prices, and the inelasticity of non-OPEC supply.  
In this study, oil dependence is defined as the vulnerability to economic costs caused by the use 
of market power by oil producing countries.  This definition includes more than the costs of 
disruptions caused by oil price shocks.  It includes the loss of output due to higher than 
competitive market prices, and the transfer of wealth from oil consumers to oil producers as a 
result of monopolistic pricing. 
 
 
3.2  TYPES AND MEASUREMENT OF OIL COSTS 
 
When monopoly power is used to raise the price of oil above competitive market levels, oil 
consuming economies incur three types of economic costs: (1) transfer of wealth, (2) reduction 
of the maximum output the economy is capable of producing due to the increased economic 
scarcity of oil (loss of potential GDP), and (3) costs of adjusting to sudden, large price changes 
(macroeconomic adjustment costs).  In the absence of sudden price changes, the first and second 
types of costs still apply as long as monopoly power is used to hold prices above competitive 
market levels. 
 
3.2.1  Transfer of Wealth 
 
When oil suppliers use market power to raise prices above competitive market levels, wealth is 
transferred from oil consumers to oil producers.  The transfer of wealth is not a loss to the global 
economy.  The wealth still exists, only its ownership has changed.4  However, from the 
perspective of the political economy of a state, the loss is real.  Oil consuming states become 
poorer, oil producing states become richer.  Since this study is concerned with impacts on the 
U.S. economy, the transfer of wealth is a real economic loss. 
 
If the hypothetical competitive market price for oil were known, the transfer of wealth could be 
easily computed.  It would equal the quantity of net imports times the difference between the 
actual market price and the hypothetical price that would prevail in a competitive market.  
Because the United States now imports 58% of its 20 million barrels per day of oil consumption, 
the transfer of wealth can be very large.  Suppose that the competitive price of oil would have 
been $15/bbl, but that the actual price was $45/bbl.  The transfer of wealth from the U.S. 
                                                 
4 More precisely, there is no economic loss provided that the cost of producing imported oil is less than the 
competitive market price.  In the case of the OPEC cartel, the higher monopoly price will encourage competitive 
fringe producers to equate the marginal cost of supplying oil to the monopoly price.  In the process, real resources 
will be expended leading to a deadweight loss.  Such losses are counted as transfer of wealth here to simplify the 
analysis.  Thus, some fraction of what is counted here as transfer of wealth is in fact a deadweight economic loss to 
the world economy. 
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economy would be ($45-$15)×20×0.58 = $348 million per day or $127 billion per year.  In 
reality, the hypothetical competitive market price cannot be observed but must be estimated.  The 
path it would have taken over a period as long as 30 years must be considered highly uncertain.  
This topic is discussed at greater length in the following section. 
 
Wealth transfer losses are illustrated in Figure 2.  At the competitive market price, PC, domestic 
oil supply is only SC but domestic demand is DC.  The difference, DC – SC, is imported.  When 
the price of oil is raised by the use of market power to PM, demand for oil contracts to DM, but 
domestic supply increases to SM, so that only DM – SM, is imported.  Consumer expenditures on 
oil were PCDC in the competitive market but consumers were receiving in benefits the entire 
integral under the demand curve from 0 to DC.  Under monopoly pricing, consumers are paying 
PMDM for oil, but receiving in benefits only the integral under the demand curve out to DM.  The 
triangular area under the demand curve labeled “Consumers’ Surplus Loss” is a deadweight 
economic loss, a potential benefit to consumers that now no one receives.  The rectangular area 
labeled “Wealth Transfer” was consumers’ surplus in the competitive market, but is a cash 
payment to suppliers of imported oil in the non-competitive market.  The consumers’ loss is the 
oil exporters’ gain.  The size of the wealth transfer is (PM– PC) × (DM– SM).  The triangular area 
under the supply curve labeled “Producers’ Surplus Loss” represents real economic resources 
spent by domestic oil suppliers to increase production that would not have been spent in the 
competitive market.  This area was formerly consumers’ surplus in the competitive market but is 
now wasted resources that must be paid for by consumers.  In the competitive market, these 
resources would have been put to use producing other goods, thus leading to a higher level of 
domestic product. 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic Representation of Wealth Transfer and Potential GDP Losses 
 
The critical assumption for estimating the transfer of wealth is clearly the hypothetical 
competitive market price of oil.  Fortunately, several researchers have estimated at different 
points in time what the price of oil would have been had world oil markets been competitive.  
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Griffin and Vielhaber (1994) put the competitive market price at $8.20/bbl (in 2000 dollars).  
Other estimates include Adelman’s (1989) $7.10 (all prices in 2000 dollars), Morison’s (1987) 
range of $7.10 to $8.70, and Brown’s (1987) range of $9.60 to $12.60/bbl.  A simulation of 
competitive oil market conditions by Berg, Kverndokk and Rosendahl (1997) concluded that had 
OPEC acted as a competitive producer the price of oil in 2000 would have been $12.10.  
Historically, the price of imported oil to U.S. refiners was $10.67/bbl in 1972, the year before 
Arab members of OPEC first used their market power to cause the oil price shock of 1973.  It 
had been relatively stable though declining slightly in the previous years.  The lowest annual oil 
price on record since 1973 is $12.48/bbl, in 1998.  Modelers’ estimates and the historical 
evidence point to a competitive oil price below $13.00/bbl, even today. 
 
The chief argument in favor of a stable or falling competitive oil price over the 1970-2004 period 
is the progress of technology.  The International Energy Agency has pointed out that “Oil supply 
costs have fallen considerably in the last 20 years.” (IEA, 2001, p. 52)  Technological progress 
has outpaced depletion thanks to advances such as 4D seismic imaging, increased application of 
computing power to data acquisition and analysis, technological advances in offshore (especially 
deepwater) drilling, and application of intelligent, multi-directional drilling technology.  In the 
same report, the IEA presented estimates of current total oil supply costs that ranged from $4/bbl 
for major Middle East producers to $6-$11/bbl for the major international oil companies (IEA, 
2001, figure 2.5).  Total oil supply costs include direct lifting costs, production costs and finding 
and development costs.  Other factors enter into the determination of competitive market prices, 
including transportation and the different qualities crude oils from different sources.  Still, it 
would be hard to imagine how the marginal cost of oil in a competitive market today could 
exceed $15/bbl, if the IEA cost estimates are accurate.  In the estimations below, $13/bbl is used 
as a reference competitive market price of oil. 
 
3.2.2  Potential GDP Losses 
 
When the price of oil is raised above the competitive market level, the higher price signals the 
economies of the world that oil is scarcer.  Economic scarcity, as opposed to physical scarcity, is 
communicated to economies by higher prices.  From an economic perspective, it is unimportant 
whether the scarcity is due to the exercise of market power or the lack of physical resources.  In a 
world where oil is scarcer, the ability of economies to produce output is decreased.  This loss of 
ability to produce is termed a loss of potential GDP to emphasize that whether or not the 
economy has not been disrupted by a price shock its potential to produce is less than it would 
have been had oil prices been lower. 
 
The loss of potential GDP could be measured by summing the losses (and gains) throughout the 
economy of producers’ and consumers’ surplus caused by higher oil prices.  Producers’ and 
consumers’ surplus losses in the oil market are illustrated in Figure 2 by the triangular areas 
under the oil supply and demand curves.  If oil were the only commodity produced and 
consumed in the U.S. economy that would be the end of it.  In reality, an increase in the price of 
oil affects the prices of many other commodities, especially forms of energy that can be 
substituted for petroleum.  These price increases will cause consumers’ and producers’ surplus 
losses in other markets, multiplying the losses in the oil market itself.   
 
In this study, potential GDP losses are estimated based on the surplus losses in the U.S. oil 
market.  First, the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus losses in the U.S. petroleum market 
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is calculated.  Recognizing that surplus losses will occur in related markets, especially in energy 
markets, a multiplier is used to convert petroleum market losses into an estimate of economy-
wide losses.5  In this section, the formulas for producers’ and consumers’ surplus losses are 
derived.  The derivations are identical except for the sign of the result, as explained below. 
 
Producers’ and Consumers’ surplus losses for dynamic, lagged adjustment supply and demand 
functions can be calculated by integrating under the curves with respect to the weighted sum of 
past and current oil prices.  It is not appropriate to integrate simply with respect to the current 
price, because the entire history of prices affects the current levels of supply and demand.  To 
find the appropriate price variable, we expand the lagged adjustment model by continuously 
substituting for the lagged dependent variable, Qt-1 . 
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The intercept, at , is indexed by t to indicate that factors other than the price of oil have been 
changing over time and affecting the level of demand (or supply). The at are unobserved, but the 
weighted sum of the at’s plus the lagged effect of Q0 can be calculated using Qt , b, λ, and the 
historical prices.  Let Kt be the sum of the other effects in year t based on historical prices, and kt 
represent the effects assuming a competitive oil price of P0. 
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(2) 
 
Next, a weighted-sum price variable, Π, can be defined to represent the cumulative effects of 
current and past prices on demand (or supply).6   
 
                                                 
5 A very rough estimate of the oil market losses multiplier was derived by observing that over the past 30 years the 
prices of natural gas, electricity and coal are correlated 0.62, 0.76 and 0.77 with the price of oil, respectively.  
Summing total expenditures on each energy type including oil weighted by the respective correlation with the price 
of oil, and dividing by expenditures on oil gives an estimated multiplier of 2.3.  Expenditures on natural gas and coal 
used to produce electricity are excluded from the calculation.  This method is equivalent to assuming that the 
elasticity of potential GDP loss with respect to the price of each form of energy is proportional to expenditures on 
that fuel relative to total GDP, and that the derivative of the price of each fuel with respect to the price of oil is equal 
to the correlation between each fuel’s price and the price of oil.  This is admittedly a very rough approximation that 
deserves refinement. 
6 The authors are grateful to their colleague, Paul Leiby, for suggesting this simple means of averaging historical 
prices. 
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With these definitions the demand or supply function for petroleum can be written as a function 
of the weighted average of past prices, Π, and integrated from any arbitrary alternative price 
series (including constant price, Pc → Πc) to the actual price series, Πt .  Consumers’ surplus is 
the area under the demand curve from Πc to Πt , minus the change in expenditures calculated 
using Πs instead of actual prices.  Producers’ surplus is the change in revenues minus the area 
under the supply curve from Πc to Πt . 
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(4) 
 
This is directly analogous to the familiar surplus triangle under the demand (or supply) curve 
defined over the Π axis (Figure 3).7   
 
This surplus measure will be in dollars, since the variable of integration, Π, is a convex 
combination, i.e., a weighted average of past prices.   
 
The key uncertainties regarding this method are (1) the potential GDP loss multiplier, (2) the 
price elasticities (price slopes) of supply and demand, and (3) the lagged adjustment rate 
parameters (λdemand , λsupply).  Estimates of these parameters are reviewed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The final step in equation (4) requires the assumption that Kt = Kc .  This implies that the factors other than price 
affecting demand over time would have evolved in the same way under either price trajectory.  By using the formula 
-½b(Πt –Πc )2 instead, this assumption is not necessary.  
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Figure 3.  Estimation of Surplus Loss by Integrating Demand Curve  
over Weighted Price Variable 
 
3.2.3  Macroeconomic Adjustment Costs 
 
The simple notion of macroeconomic adjustment costs is that they arise when a sudden price 
shock throws the economy out of equilibrium, wages and prices are not able to adjust rapidly 
enough, and underemployment of labor and capital results.  Over the past decade there have been 
important contributions to understanding the specific mechanisms by which price shocks affect 
the economy.  Analysis of detailed sectoral job creation and destruction (Davis and Haltiwanger, 
2001) has shown that oil price shocks result in more destruction than creation and have about 
twice the impact of monetary shocks.  Furthermore, the increase in unemployment due to an oil 
price increase is about ten times larger than the decrease in response to a drop in price. 
 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Huntington (2002) have produced simulations that 
illustrate how market power in the economy can magnify the economic impacts of oil price 
shocks by permitting producers to increase prices beyond the levels that perfect competition 
would allow (Jones et al., 2004).  Huntington (2002) notes that in an economy with substantial 
imperfect competition, the impacts of oil price shocks are magnified because, (1) the economy 
begins at a position where prices exceed marginal costs and moves to a new position in which 
prices exceed marginal costs by an even greater amount, thereby adding to the welfare losses, 
and (2) the economy-wide effect of the higher noncompetitive prices is to reduce aggregate 
demand, a fact not considered by any individual firm and therefore a pecuniary externality and a 
source of additional economic inefficiency. 
 
The dynamic adjustment of GDP to oil price shocks is a key issue in estimating macroeconomic 
adjustment costs.  The empirical literature reflects several attempts to formulate price measures 
that can simultaneously represent (1) the different effects of both macroeconomic and potential 
GDP effects, and (2) the economy’s dynamic responses to constantly changing oil prices.  The 
first problem is addressed in this study by calculating potential GDP and macroeconomic costs 
separately.  Potential GDP losses are calculated as the consumers’ and producers’ surplus losses 
Price
Πc Πt
Quantity 
Qt 
Q0 
Surplus 
Loss 
Triangle 
0 
Demand 
Curve 
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under dynamically adjusting oil supply and demand curves, as explained in detail in Section 3.3 
above.  Macroeconomic adjustment costs are estimated by means of oil price elasticities of GDP.  
The two processes have different dynamic responses to oil price changes and can even have 
different signs.  For example, a sudden drop in oil prices will cause macroeconomic adjustment 
losses and offsetting potential GDP gains. 
 
The dynamic adjustment of macroeconomic costs to price shocks is simulated by comparing the 
actual price of oil in year t to the price to which the economy has adjusted by year t, given the 
history of oil prices.  A key premise of the concept of macroeconomic costs is the economy 
cannot respond immediately to sudden, large price changes.  Constantly changing oil prices 
imply that the economy is continually out of equilibrium with current oil prices.  Thus, it should 
not be the change in the price of oil from the previous year that determines the macroeconomic 
adjustment impact, but rather the difference between the current price and the price to which the 
economy has become adjusted in the current year.   
 
The “adjusted prices” used to estimate macroeconomic costs are derived from the concept of the 
linear lagged adjustment model in which the observed change in a dependent variable from t-1 to 
t, Xt – Xt-1 , is assumed to be some fraction, 1>λ>0, of the difference between the ideal, long-run 
level at price Pt, xt, and last period’s actual demand.   
 ( )
tt
tttt
bPax
XxXX
+=
−=− −− 11 λ  
(5) 
 
Substituting the second equation into the first and solving for Xt , one gets the familiar lagged 
adjustment demand equation. 
 
1)1( −−++= ttt XbPaX λλλ  
(6) 
 
Long-run demand is a function of the price level, Pt , sensitivity to price represented by the 
parameter b, and other factors represented by a.8 Another way of interpreting the lagged 
adjustment model is that for the current value of Xt there exists a price, pt , such that Xt is the 
long-run equilibrium level for pt .  Substituting pt for Pt in the second equation of (5), noting that 
at pt, xt = Xt , setting the resulting expression equal to equation (6) and noting that Xt-1 = a +bpt-1, 
produces the following intuitive result. 
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The current adjusted price is a weighted average of the current period’s actual price and last 
period’s adjusted price.  A starting value for the adjusted price must be chosen, po , but since oil 
                                                 
8 Allowing other factors to vary over time leads to a more complicated formula for the “adjusted price.”   If other 
factors are changing slowly, year-to-year price changes are large, and adjustment is relatively rapid, the simplified 
formula should be a reasonable approximation. 
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prices were quite stable prior to 1973 it should be a reasonable approximation to assume that p0 = 
P1972 . 
 
 
3.3  ISSUES IN ESTIMATING ECONOMIC COSTS 
 
The literature of energy economics has addressed the relationship between the price of oil and 
the GDP at length.  Three key issues for estimating the costs of oil dependence addressed in this 
literature are: (1) the size of oil price’s impact on U.S. GDP, (2) whether this impact has been 
changing over time, and (3) how to define a price shock.  There should be little controversy 
about whether oil price shocks reduce U.S. GDP.  Jones et al. (2004) comprehensively reviewed 
the recent literature on whether and how oil prices affect the economy, with particular attention 
to the mechanisms through which oil price shocks affect GDP, the effects of monetary policy, 
and the stability and magnitude of the oil price-GDP relationship.  They concluded that post oil 
shock recessionary movements of GDP are primarily due to the oil price shocks themselves and 
not changes in monetary policy made to accommodate the shocks.  Empirical research has shown 
that substantial reallocation of labor occurs after an oil price shock.  The costly processes by 
which factors must be reallocated among industries appears to be a key cause of short-lived 
negative impacts of price shocks.  Based on their comprehensive review of the literature Jones et 
al. (2004) put forward -0.055 as the best consensus estimate of the elasticity of GDP with respect 
to a price shock, where a shock is defined as a price increase that exceeds a three-year high. 
   
The elasticity of GDP with respect to the price of oil is a useful summary measure of the 
sensitivity of the economy to oil price shocks. Statistical estimates of the relationship between 
GDP and oil price depend to a degree on how researchers define an oil price shock.  The earliest 
studies simply used the price of oil.  Over time, researchers discovered that the economy 
responded asymmetrically to oil price increases and decreases, which contributed to instability in 
the relationship between GDP and oil prices over time.  Mork (1989) offered the first asymmetric 
specification of an oil price shock by using different variables to represent price increases and 
decreases.  Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) used a measure of the surprise content of the oil price 
change, which they believed yielded a stable oil price-GDP relationship. Their measure divided 
the change in oil price by an index of the recent volatility of oil prices, thereby diminishing 
shocks occurring in a period of volatility.  Hamilton (1996) created a new variable he called the 
Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI), defined as the difference between the percent increase in a 
current period and the highest percent increase in the previous four quarters.  Hamilton and 
Herrera (2001) found that both Lee, Ni and Ratti’s measure and NOPI had stable relationships 
with GDP over time, but that the simple price of oil and Mork’s measure did not.  
  
In our view, the asymmetric response of the economy to oil price changes is largely if not 
entirely due to the two different mechanisms by which oil prices affect GDP: (1) loss of potential 
GDP, and (2) macroeconomic adjustment costs.9  The first type of cost is incurred whenever oil 
prices are raised above competitive market levels.  The second occurs only in the event of a price 
shock.  When there is a sudden, unanticipated price increase, both types of cost have a negative 
impact on the economy.  When prices suddenly fall the economy benefits from an increase in 
potential GDP and a reduction in the transfer of wealth but still suffers adjustment costs.  The 
                                                 
9 The transfer of wealth will not necessarily have a negative impact on U.S. GDP.  This will depend on whether the 
outflow of wealth reduces final demand for U.S. output, either permanently or temporarily. 
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positive effect may substantially or entirely offset the negative effect of the (downward) price 
shock.  As Huntington (2002, pp. 5-6) has put it, “If both positive and negative energy price 
shocks create short-run unemployment as resources shift from one sector to another, these shifts 
between sectors could dampen and even eliminate the otherwise positive effect resulting from a 
sudden energy price decline.”  Moreover, the dynamics of the two types of costs are different.  
The adjustment to a price shock may occur over a period of 3 or more years as wages and prices 
adapt.  But adjustment of the economy’s capital stock of energy using equipment takes 10 years 
and often much longer.  As a consequence, there should not be a simple, stable relationship 
between the GDP and a fluctuating price of oil.  As will be seen below, modeling each 
component separately allows for complex patterns of response. 
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the current price of oil and the macroeconomic 
“adjusted price”, assuming λ = 0.33.  Even in the first year of a price shock (e.g., 1974), some 
adjustment occurs, so that the difference between the current price and the adjusted price is 
somewhat smaller than that between the current price and the previous year’s price.  However, in 
the year after the price shock (1975) there is still a substantial difference between the current 
price and the adjusted price although there is almost no difference between the actual price in 
1975 and the actual price in 1974.  Interestingly, the small price shock in 1990 would have no 
immediate macroeconomic effect since the adjusted price equaled the current price in that year.  
A much more slowly adjusting price path with λ = 0.15 is also shown in Figure 4.  This path is 
indicative of the rate at which potential GDP losses adjust to price changes. 
 
Historical Oil Prices and Dynamically Adjusting Oil Prices
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
20
00
 $
 p
er
 B
ar
re
l
Historical
lambda = 0.333
lambda = 0.15
 
Figure 4.  Historical Oil Prices and Dynamically Adjusting Oil Prices 
 
The dynamics of all three cost components can be seen by comparing the two price paths shown 
in Figure 4 with the cost impacts graphed in Figure 5.  When oil prices first jumped in 1973, the 
transfer of wealth and macroeconomic shock components responded immediately, peaking in 
1974, the second year of the shock.  Although the macroeconomic cost adjustment is relatively 
rapid, there are large differences in the initial years of the price shock.  The potential GDP 
component responds much more slowly because it is a function of the difference between the 
competitive market price and the price to which the entire productive capital of the economy has 
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adjusted.  Because capital turnover is a much slower process, the loss of potential GDP is quite 
small in the first two years of the first price shock.  In 1986, when oil prices fell from $40/bbl to 
$20/bbl, potential GDP losses decreased while macroeconomic costs increased.  The result is 
almost no change in the sum of the two GDP impacts from 1985 to 1987.  To observers watching 
the change in GDP from one year to the next, the downward price shock would appear to have 
had no impact at all.  The interactions of macroeconomic adjustment costs and potential GDP 
losses produce more complex responses to oil price changes than would a simple oil price 
elasticity of GDP.  These complex, dynamic responses are consistent with the types of responses 
represented in the more recent econometric studies of this subject (Jones et al., 2004). 
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Figure 5.  Estimated Costs of Oil Dependence: Case 1a Assumptions 
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4.  UPDATING THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this section four changes to the cost estimation methods used in our previous studies are 
explained in detail: (1) the inclusion of stochastic price paths for competitive oil prices, (2) a 
change in the pattern of macroeconomic adjustment costs over time to better approximate the 
predictions of macroeconomic models, (3) the updating of data and key parameter values based 
on recent evidence (the key parameters are: (a) the oil price elasticity of GDP, (b) the price 
elasticity of U.S. oil demand, (c) the demand adjustment rate, (d) the price elasticity of U.S. oil 
supply, and (e) the supply adjustment rate), and (4) the use of Monte Carlo simulation to describe 
uncertainties and perform sensitivity analysis. 
 
  
4.1  STOCHASTIC PRICE PATHS 
 
Estimating the costs of oil dependence by comparing historical prices to a hypothetical 
competitive market price of oil is a key premise of this analysis.  But this premise raises the 
difficult question of what path oil prices might have taken in a “contrary-to-fact” competitive oil 
market.  In previous assessments, historical oil prices have been compared to a constant, 
competitive market price.  Given the uncertainties of world oil supply and demand and the 
inelasticity of both in the short run, it may seem unreasonable to assume there would be no price 
volatility even in a competitive market.  Intuition suggests that the actual history of world oil 
prices might be better compared to a stochastic price path that allows for a certain degree of 
volatility. 
 
In the simulations below, historical world oil prices are compared both to a constant competitive 
price and to time-varying prices generated by a stochastic model with first-order autocorrelation 
with and without a trend.  For any particular stochastic price path the estimated costs of oil 
dependence could be higher or lower than the constant price path, depending on whether the 
hypothetical price series is negatively or positively correlated with the historical price shocks.  
When there is no trend in the stochastic price path the variability of cost estimates should 
increase but not their expected values.   
 
A plausible stochastic price model can be constructed in the following way.  Let Pt be the price 
of oil in year t, P be the average competitive price of oil, ρ be a correlation coefficient, and δ a 
drift (or trend) coefficient.  Let εt be a random error term distributed N(0,σ), where σ = s×P, s 
being a standard deviation divided by its mean.  The following model is used to generate a 
different price series for each stochastic price simulation. 
 
ttttt eeandtePP ερδ +=++= −1  
(8) 
 
Although it cannot be asserted that the recent historical record contains any period during which 
world oil prices were indisputably produced by competitive market forces, there are periods 
during which OPEC’s influence was substantially diminished.  Historical prices over the period 
1987-2003 were used to estimate the standard deviation (σ) of price relative to the mean price, P .  
This produced estimates of 0.24 for ρ and $3.75 for the standard deviation of Pt, 18% of the 
mean price of $21.20 from 1987-2003.  In the simulations below, we use ρ = 0.25 and σ equals 
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0.18 times the assumed competitive market price of oil.  The period 1987-2003 includes the oil 
price shock associated with the first Persian Gulf War. 
 
A sample of alternative price paths produced by this stochastic model is shown in Figure 6.  
Three price paths, labeled stochastic + drift, are independent realizations of the stochastic model 
of equation 1, assuming an upward drift in prices at the rate of $0.25/bbl/year.  The upward 
drifting price path without random components is shown, labeled deterministic drift. A stochastic 
price path without drift is also shown, and all can be compared to a constant price of $13/bbl.  As 
will be seen in the results below, assuming stochastic prices without drift has little impact on the 
estimated costs of oil dependence, as expected. 
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Figure 6.  Stochastic Paths for the Competitive Price of Oil 
 
In the simulations below we have assumed both upward and downward oil price drift are 
possible.  On the one hand, it can be argued that the depletion of oil resources should lead to an 
upward drift in oil prices, either because of the Hotelling resource exhaustion effect or because 
of an increasing level of effort required to produce from increasingly depleted or more difficult 
to access deposits.  But as several have pointed out, such a trend runs counter to much of the 
historical experience with mineral resources (e.g., Watkins, 1992; Adelman and Lynch, 1997).  
In most cases, it appears that technological progress outpaces depletion, leading to decreasing 
not increasing mineral resource costs over time.  Certainly there is ample evidence of 
technological progress in oil discovery and production (e.g., Alazard, 1996).  Thus, there appears 
to us to be no compelling reason to believe that declining competitive oil prices is a less 
reasonable assumption than upward drifting oil prices.  
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4.2  TIMING OF MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS 
 
Macro-economic models used to estimate the impacts of oil price shocks on GDP generally 
predict a greater impact in the year following the initial price shock than in the year in which the 
shock actually occurs.  According to Jones et al. (2004, p. 13)10, “…virtually all empirical studies 
have found the largest impacts of oil prices on output in the 3rd and 4th quarters, and continued 
effects in later quarters.”  This appears to be the result of various lags in the economy’s response 
to oil price changes.  For some models, impacts then decay in succeeding years.  The energy 
modeling forum compared the predictions of GDP impacts from 14 different macroeconomic 
models, given a 50% increase in oil price starting in 1983 and persisting indefinitely (Hickman, 
1987).  The majority predicted a substantially greater impact in the second year of the price 
increase (Figure 7). 
 
GDP Impacts of a 50% Increase in the Price of Oil Predicted by 14 Models
(Hickman, 1987, table 8)
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Figure 7.  Distribution of Oil Price Impacts on GDP over Four Years 
 
It is important to keep in mind that these models are representing, in theory, the combined 
macroeconomic adjustment and potential GDP effects.  Since we are estimating potential GDP 
losses independently, only a fraction of the total GDP elasticity should be attributed to 
macroeconomic costs.  However, because oil supply and demand adjusts more slowly than 
wages and prices, the majority of the oil price impact in the first few years will be due to 
macroeconomic adjustment costs.  In the simulation below we assume that 75% of the 
maximum, initial GDP impact is due to macroeconomic adjustment costs.  Thus, if the overall 
maximum GDP elasticity is judged to be -0.055, then the maximum macroeconomic adjustment 
cost elasticity will be -0.04. 
 
                                                 
10 The literature review by Jones et al. (2004) did not include Santini (1994) which also found that energy prices 
affect GDP most strongly with a 1-year lag. 
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A simple average of the model predictions shown in Figure 7 indicates a first-year impact of 
-1.77% followed by a -2.71% loss of GDP in the second year (Figure 8).  The medians of the 
estimated first- and second-year impacts are -1.42% and -2.69%, respectively.  Thus, the models 
tend to predict that somewhere between half and two-thirds of the maximum second year impact 
is felt in the first year.   
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Figure 8.  Average Predicted Impacts of Oil Price on GDP over Four Years 
 
The cost estimation methodology has been modified to reflect the lagged behavior exhibited by 
the majority of models tested by Hickman (1987).  The new equation for the oil price elasticity 
of GDP is the following (abs( ) indicates the absolute value function). 
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In equation (9) β is the second-year, maximum oil price elasticity of GDP, φt is the oil cost share 
of GDP in the current year (φ1983 is the reference year in which β is assumed to apply), Pt is the 
actual price of oil in year t while pt in the denominator is the price to which the economy has 
adjusted, and λ is the fraction of the maximum macroeconomic adjustment impact assumed to 
occur in the first year.  The data presented above suggest that λ is approximately 0.55. 
 
In equation (9) price shocks in opposite directions in succeeding years would not cancel each 
other; both would have a disruptive effect on the economy.  There is also no threshold effect.  A 
very small price movement would have a very small negative effect.  For example, a 10% 
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increase in oil price occurring in 2003 (when the oil cost share of GDP was 1.9% compared with 
4.6% in 1983, so that the effective elasticity would be (1.9/4.6) 0.75 (-0.055) = -0.17 instead of 
-0.055) would cause a loss of 0.1% = 0.55*(1-(1.1-0.017)) of GDP in that year.  The 2003 price 
shock would also have a lagged effect in the following year of almost the same amount.  
 
Given this new method, the maximum GDP impact should be based on the second year estimates 
of the fourteen models.  Since the estimates shown in Figures 7 and 8 are based on a 50% 
increase in oil prices, an estimate of price elasticity would be double these values, or about 
-0.054.  Recent empirical evidence on the oil price elasticity of GDP is considered in the 
following section. 
 
 
4.3  RECONSIDERING KEY PARAMETERS 
 
In this section, recent empirical evidence on the values of five critical parameters is reviewed. 
 
4.3.1 The Oil Price Elasticity of GDP 
 
In a previous study (Greene & Tishchishyna, 2001) the elasticity of GDP with respect to the 
price of oil was assumed to be -0.046.  This estimate is the median of the predictions of fourteen 
models reported in a study by the Energy Modeling Forum for the period 1983-1986, shown here 
in Table 1.  It also includes all four years of predictions, not just the maximum impact in year 2.  
The mean and median of the estimates for year 2 is -0.054.  Given the decreasing consumption of 
oil per dollar of GDP over time, one might expect more recent estimates to be smaller in absolute 
value.  However, an elasticity of -0.055 was judged to be a consensus of the recent literature by 
Jones et al. (2004). 
 
Table 2 shows the elasticities from six recent studies included in the Jones et al. (2004) review.  
Huntington’s 1998 and 2002 analyses of crude oil prices and U.S. economic performance (not 
included in Jones et al., 2004) also report estimates of the oil price-GDP elasticity.  Perhaps the 
most significant implication of these recent studies is the lack of evidence of a decreasing 
vulnerability to oil price shocks over time.  The estimates derived from 14 models by Hickman 
(Table 1) indicate an oil price elasticity of GDP of -0.054 (based on 2nd year mean or median 
impact) for the period 1983-1986.  The more recent estimates presented in Table 2 are of the 
same general magnitude.  Thus, the recent empirical literature tends to contradict the intuitively 
appealing concept that the vulnerability of the economy to oil price shocks has decreased as the 
amount spent on oil has decreased relative to the GDP. 
 
Despite the contradictory evidence from empirical studies, we still believe that the vulnerability 
of the economy to oil price shocks should be relatively smaller today than it was during the 
1970s and 1980s (e.g., Parry and Darmstadter, 2003, p. 3; Brown and Yücel, 2002).11  Because 
of the many complex factors that determine the impact of oil prices on the economy, there is no 
simple theory that can be applied to decide the question.  It seems clear that if the economies of 
the world consumed almost no oil, the impact of an oil price shock on output would be 
                                                 
11 The Energy Information Administration’s (US DOE/EIA, 2004a) “Rules of Thumb for Oil Supply Disruptions” 
specifies a 0.05 to 0.1 percent decline in real GDP for each 10% increase in the price of oil, an implied elasticity 
range of -0.005 to -0.001. This is only one tenth to one fifth of the literature-based estimates perhaps indicating a 
belief that the economy’s sensitivity to oil prices has decreased dramatically.    
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approximately zero.  The question is then what path the elasticity may take between a value of 
-0.055 and zero as oil consumption decreases to zero.   
 
Table 1.  Estimates of Elasticity of GNP with Respect to Oil Price 
(50% Price Shock, Effect on Real GNP) 
 
 Percent Change in Real GNP 
MODEL 1983 1984 1985 1986 
BEA -1.754  -3.463  -3.754  -4.012  
Chase -0.438  -2.531  -2.686  -2.682  
DRI -1.585  -2.298  -2.398  -2.246  
LINK -1.767  -2.480  -3.071  -3.339  
Michigan -2.297  -3.340  -3.106  -2.692  
MPS -1.606  -3.174  -2.946  -1.900  
Wharton -2.363  -2.949  -3.518  -3.524  
Claremont -1.253  -3.638  -2.289  -1.589  
FRB MCM -0.981  -1.001  -1.252  -1.160  
Hickman-Coen -1.171  -2.215  -1.780  -1.034  
Hubbard-Fry -0.954  -1.080  -0.957  -1.058  
Mork -6.243  -4.709  -3.809  -3.406  
St. Louis -1.224  -2.847  -1.540  -1.578  
MACE -1.192  -2.159  -2.501  -2.426  
Average -1.77  -2.71  -2.54  -2.33  
   Ratio to Yr 2 0.66  1.00  0.94  0.86  
Median -1.419  -2.689  -2.594  -2.336  
   Ratio to Yr 2 0.53  1.00  0.96  0.87  
Lower Quartile -1.18  -2.24  -1.91  -1.58  
   Ratio to Yr 2 0.53  1.00  0.85  0.71  
     Source: (Hickman, B.G., 1987, table 8) 
 
Table 2.  Recent Estimates of the Elasticity of GDP with Respect to the Price of Crude Oil 
 
Study Estimate 
Mory (1993) -0.055 
Mork et al. (1994) -0.054 
Hamilton and Herrera (2001) -0.055 over 42 months 
Bernanke et al. (1997) -0.027 over 18 months 
Hamilton (2003) -0.116 using 3-year NOPI shock measure, over 8 quarters  
 -0.054 using the LNR shock measure 
Huntington (1999) 
Huntington (2002) 
 
U.S. Dept. of Energy 
-0.110 
-0.040 
 
-0.025 to -0.055 
Source: Jones et al. (2004) 
 
In previous reports, the maintained hypothesis has been that the oil price elasticity of GDP is 
proportional to total expenditures on oil divided by GDP (the “oil cost share” of GDP, shown in 
Figure 9).  Mitigating factors, such as the concentration of oil use in the transportation sector and 
increased market power in other sectors of the economy (Huntington, 2002, makes an impressive 
case for this effect) might offset the effect of a smaller oil expenditure share, at least over some 
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range.  Add to this possibility the fact that the empirical evidence supports this conclusion and 
one must also admit the possibility of an approximately constant oil price elasticity of GDP over 
the past 30 years.  For this reason, we have adopted a new maintained hypothesis that gives equal 
probability to constant elasticity versus elasticity scaled by the oil expenditure share of GDP. 
 
Oil Expenditures as a Percent of U.S. GDP and the Elasticity of 
GDP with Respect to Oil Price
-8%
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Figure 9. Total Expenditures on Oil as a Percent (Cost Share) of GDP 
 
Because of the inelasticity of oil demand, the oil expenditure share of GDP reflects the pattern of 
oil prices over the past 35 years (Figure 9).  In 1983, the starting date for the EMF simulations of 
oil price impacts shown in Table 2, the oil expenditure share of GDP was 4.6%.  This fell to a 
low of 0.9% in 1998 and then rose to 1.5% in 2004.  If the macroeconomic portion of the 
maximum (second year) impact of an oil price shock is taken to be 80%, then the oil price 
elasticity of GDP for macroeconomic adjustment costs (excluding potential GDP impacts) would 
be -0.05*0.8 = -0.04 in 1983.  In 2004, the expenditure share adjusted oil price elasticity of GDP 
(for macroeconomic adjustment costs) would be a great deal smaller: -0.05*0.8*(0.015/0.046) = 
-0.013.  This result is consistent with Brown and Yücel’s (1995) assertion that the effects of price 
shocks on the U.S. economy may have been only one third as large in the year 2000 as when oil 
prices were at their height in the early 1980s.  The scaling of GDP impacts by the oil expenditure 
share of GDP affects only macroeconomic adjustment costs, since the oil price elasticity of GDP 
is not used in calculating the transfer of wealth or potential GDP components.   
 
4.3.2  Oil Supply and Demand Elasticities 
 
Several recent studies imply that U.S. oil supply and demand elasticities may be slightly greater 
than assumed in our previous reports.  Price elasticities of oil demand from a number of recent 
studies were evaluated by Atkins and Jazayeri (2004).  These are summarized in Table 3.  The 
short-run price elasticity estimates had a mean value of -0.052 and a median of -0.05.  The long-
run estimates showed much greater variability, but with a mean and median of -0.36 and -0.32, 
respectively.  Assuming a linear lagged adjustment demand equation, these imply mean and 
median adjustment rates of 0.86 and 0.84, respectively. 
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Table 3. Recent Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Oil Demand 
 
 
Author Short-Run Long-Run 
Adjustment 
Rate Region 
Kalymon (1975) -- -0.5 -- various 
Brown and Philips (1980) -0.08 -- --  
Dahl (1993) -0.05 to -0.09 -0.16 to -0.23 0.6 to 0.7 various 
Peseran, et al. (1998) -0.03 -0.48 0.9  
Gately & Huntington (2002) -0.05 -0.59 to -0.64 0.9 OECD 
Gately & Huntington (2002) -0.03 -0.16 to -0.27 0.8 to 0.9 non-OECD 
Cooper (2003)  0.0 to -0.11 0.0 to -0.53 0.8 23 countries 
Cooper (2003) -0.024 to -0.069 -0.18 to -0.45 0.8 to 0.9 G-7 
Hunt & Ninomiya (2003) -- -0.08 to -0.12 -- Japan, UK 
     Source: Cooper (2003) 
 
Greene, Jones and Leiby (1995) found a range of estimates of short-run demand elasticities of 
-0.027 to -0.116, with a mean of -0.070 and a median value of -0.062.  Long-run elasticities 
ranged from -0.16 to -2.5, with mean and median values of -0.65 and -0.54, respectively.  
Adjustment rates varied widely, from 0.58 to 0.99 (associated with the long-run elasticity of 
-2.5).   The mean and median values imply an adjustment rate of 0.89.  These estimates were 
based on oil prices averaging approximately $35 per barrel (2000 $).  
 
Gately and Huntington (2002) compared constant elasticity demand models with models that 
allowed different responses to price increases and decreases.  They estimated separate models for 
OECD and non-OECD countries.  For OECD countries, the short-run elasticity of their constant 
elasticity model was -0.05, while their asymmetric model indicated an elasticity of -0.04 for 
price decreases and -0.08 for increasing prices.  Tests indicated that the asymmetric model was 
significantly better than the constant elasticity model.  The lagged adjustment coefficient 
estimates ranged from 0.88 to 0.91, suggesting long-run elasticities approximately ten times as 
large as the short-run values.  Long-run elasticities were -0.59 for the constant elasticity model 
and -0.64 to -0.71 for two versions of the asymmetric model.  Elasticities for non-OECD 
countries were smaller: -0.03 for the short-run elasticity in the constant elasticity model, +0.04 to 
-0.05 in the asymmetric model, which was not consistently a superior formulation for non-OECD 
countries.  Lagged adjustment coefficient estimates were 0.82 to 0.84, and long-run elasticity 
estimates ranged from -0.16 to -0.27.   
 
Less information is available concerning the price elasticity of oil supply.  Huntington (1991) 
reviewed estimates of the price elasticity of oil supply outside of OPEC (Table 4).  He found that 
short-run elasticity estimates were considerably less than +0.1, averaging +0.03 for total non-
OPEC supply and +0.05 for the United States and other OECD countries.  In his simulation 
modeling, Huntington (1994) chose a value of +0.4 for the long-run price elasticity of oil supply 
and an adjustment rate of 0.9, implying a short-run elasticity of +0.04.  Gately (2004) assumed a 
short-run, non-OPEC oil supply elasticity of between 0.03 and 0.05 in his analysis of OPEC’s 
incentives to expand production capacity.  His long-run supply elasticity estimates ranged from 
0.15 to 0.58, implying adjustment rates between 0.80 and 0.91. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Elasticity of U.S. Oil Supply 
 
Model/Source Short-Run Long-Run  
EIA 0.117 0.34 0.66 
Gately 0.045 0.577 0.92 
CERI 0.137 0.195 0.30 
HOMS 0.012 0.522 0.98 
FRB Dallas 0.013 0.475 0.97 
HOMS-I 0.0859 0.662 0.87 
    
Average 0.068 0.462 0.85 
            Source: Huntington, 1991, table A.3. 
 
Linear lagged adjustment equations are used to represent U.S. oil demand and supply for 
purposes of calculating losses of potential GDP.  The linear form implies that price elasticities 
are not constant over time, but vary with the price of oil and quantities consumed and produced.   
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The price elasticities given above and shown in Table 6 below are assumed to apply at the 
average price of oil over the period 1970-2004, $28/bbl, and the average quantities of U.S. 
demand (17.5 mmbd) and supply (10.2 mmbd).  Based on the evidence presented above, the 
short-run price elasticity of U.S. oil demand is assumed to be -0.06 at the average price of oil 
since 1971 ($28/bbl) and the average level of U.S. demand (17.45 mmbd).  The short-run 
elasticity of supply is assumed to be +0.05 at the same price and at the average U.S. oil 
production for 1971-2004 of 10.24 mmbd).  The adjustment rates are assumed to be 0.85 for 
demand and supply (λ = 0.15), so that the long-run elasticities are -0.4 and +0.33, again at 
$28/bbl.  More elastic supply and demand implies larger potential GDP losses. 
 
 4.3.3  Updating Historical Data, 2005 Estimates 
 
All data were updated to 2004 based on statistics available in the Energy Information 
Administration’s Annual Energy Review 2003 and other EIA reports detailed listing of data and 
sources is provided in Table 5.  At the time of writing, incomplete data were available for some 
data series for 2004.  Annualized year-to-date data available on the EIA’s web site were used.  
Depending on the data series, the ending month ranged from July to December, 2004. 
 
 26 
Table 5.  List of Data Sources 
 
Data for 2004 - 2005 
Energy Information Administration. 2005. Short Term Energy Outlook.  <http://www.eia. 
doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/pdf/feb05.pdf>  February 8, 2005. 
Total World Oil Production: Table 3 International Petroleum Supply and Demand: Row ‘Total 
World Supply,’ columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
OPEC Oil Production: Table 3 International Petroleum Supply and Demand: Row ‘OPEC 
Supply,’ columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
Net Imports: Table 5 U.S. Petroleum Supply and Demand: Row ‘Total Petroleum Net Imports,’ 
columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
US Oil Demand: Table 5 U.S. Petroleum Supply and Demand: Row ‘Total Demand,’ columns 
‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
Refiner Acquisition Costs (Imported): Table 4 U.S. Energy Prices: Row ‘Crude Oil Prices – 
Imported Average,’ columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005.  Domestic and Composite prices are 
taken as a ratio of the Imported price. 
GDP Implicit Price Deflator: Table 1 U.S. Macroeconomic and Weather Assumptions: Row 
‘GDP Implicit Price Deflator,’ columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
Gross Domestic Product: Table 1 U.S. Macroeconomic and Weather Assumptions: Row ‘Real 
GDP,’ columns ‘Year’ 2004 and 2005 
Imports from OPEC: 2005 Imports assumed to be the same as 2004 levels 
 
Data for 1970 – 2003 
Energy Information Administration. 2004. “Oil Production.” International Petroleum 
Monthly.  <http://www.eia.doe.gov/ipm/toc.html>  November 1, 2004. 
Total World Oil Production:Table 1.4 World Oil Supply: Column ‘World.’   
OPEC Oil Production:Table 1.4 World Oil Supply: Column ‘OPEC.’   
 
Energy Information Administration, 2004.  Monthly Energy Review.  Publication 
DOE/EIA-0035(2004/10).  Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. Department 
of Energy.  October 2004.   
Net Imports: Table 1.7 Overview of U.S. Petroleum Trade: Columns ‘Net Imports.’   
Imports from OPEC: Table 1.7 Overview of U.S. Petroleum Trade: Column ‘Imports from 
OPEC.’  Includes 2004 average. 
US Oil Demand: Table 1.7 Overview of U.S. Petroleum Trade: Column ‘Products Supplied’ (US 
Oil Demand).   
Refiner Acquisition Costs: Table 9.1 Crude Oil Price Summary: Columns ‘Refiner Acquisition 
Cost’ for Domestic, Imported, and Composite. 
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Table 5.  List of Data Sources (continued) 
 US Oil Production: Production = US Oil Demand – Net Imports 
ROW Oil Production: Production = World Oil Production – OPEC Oil Production – US Oil 
Production 
 
Energy Information Administration, 2004.  Annual Energy Review 2003.  Publication 
DOE/EIA-0384.  Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. Department of 
Energy. September 2004.   
GDP Implicit Price Deflator: Table D1 Population and U.S. Gross Domestic Product, Selected 
Years, 1949-2003: Column ‘US GDP – Implicit Price Deflator (2000 = 1.00000).’  
Gross Domestic Product: Table D1 Population and U.S. Gross Domestic Product, Selected 
Years, 1949-2003: Column ‘US GDP – Billion Chained (2000) Dollars.’  
 
Discount Rate: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “Discount Rates – Historical  Discount 
Rate.” <http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/disc.cfm> 
 
 
4.4  MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
 
A fourth major change to the cost estimation method is the use of Monte Carlo simulation.  
Simulations were carried out using the @Risk software (Palisade, 2002).  For a Monte Carlo risk 
analysis, the critical assumptions are the probability distributions of the key model parameters 
(Table 6).  In general, there is scant evidence on which to base these distributions.  In some 
cases, the range of estimates of a parameter that can be found in the literature may be a guide.  
The reader may compare, for example, the range assumed for the oil price elasticity of GDP with 
the literature estimates shown in Tables 1 and 2 above.  Even in such cases there is little on 
which to base the shape of the distribution of values and even less to correlate one parameter’s 
distribution with another’s.  Here we have followed five principles: 
 
1. Where ample estimates are available we use them to establish a parameter’s central 
tendency and range. 
2. Where there is little evidence on the distribution of a parameter, we choose a range 
large enough to determine the sensitivity of the results to that parameter. 
3. In all cases we have chosen triangular distributions, except that we use the binomial 
distribution to represent uncertainty about whether or not the oil price elasticity will 
be constant or scaled to oil expenditures as a share of GDP. 
4. No correlations among parameters are assumed, i.e., they are considered to be 
independent. 
 
Given this approach, the resulting probability distributions of cost estimates should be 
interpreted as conditional on our assumptions and not as revealing the true probability 
distribution of costs. If, on the other hand, one accepts our probability distributions as a 
reasonable description of uncertainty, then one should accept the resulting distribution of cost 
estimates as reasonably characterizing the range of uncertainty. 
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Five alternative cases have been analyzed.  Cases 1, 1a and 1b are based on a competitive oil 
price that is constant over time (1970-2004) but varies from one simulation run to another 
according to the distribution specified in Table 6.  Case 1 gives equal probability to the view that 
the oil price elasticity of GDP may be constant over time versus the view that it should be scaled 
by oil expenditures as a share of GDP.  Case 1a assumes that the oil price elasticity varies in 
proportion to the oil cost share of GDP.  Case 1b assumes a constant oil price elasticity of GDP 
over time.  In all three cases the GDP elasticity varies over simulations according to the 
probability distribution specified in Table 6.  Cases 2 and 2a include stochastic competitive oil 
price paths with no drift (Case 2) and with drift (Case 2a). 
 
Table 6. Distributions of Key Parameters and Application in Alternative Cases 
 
 
For all simulations, the Latin Hypercube method of sampling from probability distributions was 
used and 5,000 iterations were executed for each case.  This method insures that the sensitivity of 
cost estimates to each parameter will be accurately estimated, provided that we have specified a 
reasonable range of possible values for each parameter.   
 
 
Parameter Distribution 
Case 
1 
Case 
1a 
Case 
1b 
Case 
2 
Case 
2a 
Oil Price Elasticity of GDP Triang (-0.09, -0.055, -0.02) X X X X X 
Macro. Share of GDP Elasticity Triang (0.6, 0.75 0.9) X X X X X 
1st Year Macro. Rel. to 2nd  Triang (0.45, 0.55, 0.65) X X X X X 
Macro. Cost Adj. Rate Triang (0.222, 0.333, 0.444) X X X X X 
Constant v. Relative GDP Elast. Binomial (0,1; p=0.5) X Rel. Const. X X 
Potential GDP Loss Adj. Rate Triang (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) X X X X X 
       Demand Triang (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) X X X X X 
        Supply Triang (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) X X X X X 
Potential GDP Loss Multiplier Triang (1.5, 2.25, 3.0) X X X X X 
US Oil Demand Elasticity Triang (-0.08, -0.06, -0.04) X X X X X 
US Oil Demand Adj. Rate Triang (0.05, 0.15, 0.25) X X X X X 
US Oil Supply Elasticity Triang (0.03, 0.05, 0.07) X X X X X 
US Oil Supply Adj. Rate Triang (0.05, 0.15, 0.25) X X X X X 
Mean Competitive Oil Price Triang ($10, $13, $16) X X X - - 
Oil Price Drift (cents/yr) Triang (9.6774, 0, -9.6774) - - - - X 
Random Price Error Correlation Triang (0.1, 0.25, 0.4) - - - X X 
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5.  RESULTS 
 
 
The costs of oil dependence have been very large under any of the alternative cases examined.  
Given the reference Case 1 assumptions the total costs of oil dependence since 1973 come to 
$3.6 trillion (2000 constant, undiscounted dollars).  Adjusted to present value, the total past costs 
of oil dependence exceed $8 trillion, an amount greater than the national debt ($7.5 trillion).  
Across the range of cases analyzed, the mean estimates of the total costs of oil dependence range 
from $3.3 to $3.9 trillion (2000 constant $).  Total cost is relatively evenly divided between the 
three categories of cost.  The Case 1 estimates are transfer of wealth ($1.3T), potential GDP 
losses ($1.0T) and macroeconomic adjustment costs ($1.2T).   
 
 
5.1  REFERENCE CASE 1 
 
The Case 1 simulation allows the competitive price of oil to vary between $10 and $16 with a 
mean and most likely value of $13 per barrel.  Whatever competitive price is chosen for a single 
run remains constant from 1973 to 2004.  There is no time-trend in the competitive price of oil 
and random oil price paths are not simulated in Case 1.  All of the 10 other parameters not 
related to the competitive price of oil also vary, according to the distributions shown in Table 6.  
The cumulative, total, economic cost of oil dependence ranges between $2.7 and $4.7 trillion (a 
90% sensitivity interval), with a mean value of $3.6 trillion (2000 $).  The reader is reminded 
that this does not imply that the true economic costs lie between $2.7 and $4.7 trillion with 90% 
confidence, but rather that 90% of the simulation results fell within this interval (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.  Total Economic Losses in the Reference Case Simulations (Case 1) 
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The key determinants of the estimated costs of oil dependence in Case 1 are shown in the 
tornado chart in Figure 11. Tornado charts graph normalized coefficients from a regression of 
estimated cost on the parameter values.  The values at the end of the bars indicate by how many 
standard deviations the estimated cost will change if the input variable changes by one standard 
deviation.  Two factors emerge as the most important, both about equally important.  A one 
standard deviation increase in these variables results in a one-half standard deviation decrease in 
the costs of oil dependence (Table 7).  The two are associated with the impacts of oil price 
shocks: (1) the value of the oil price elasticity of GDP, and (2) whether that elasticity is assumed 
to remain constant over time or to vary in proportion to oil expenditures as a share of GDP.  A 
one standard deviation change in the estimated total cost is $603 billion, so a one standard 
deviation increase in the oil price elasticity of GDP would result in a $316 billion decrease in the 
total costs of oil dependence.  The oil price elasticity of GDP is a negative number, so increasing 
it would bring it closer to zero.  One standard deviation of the GDP elasticity is 0.014, which 
implies that an increase in the oil price elasticity of GDP from -0.055 to -0.041 would reduce 
total estimated costs by $316 billion.  Also important is the competitive price of oil which affects 
all three cost components.  Here one standard deviation is $1.22/bbl.  Increasing the assumed 
competitive price of oil from $13 to $15.50 (two standard deviations) would decrease the 
estimated total costs of oil dependence by $480 billion. 
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Figure 11.  Sensitivity Analysis for Total Economic Costs: Case 1 
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Table 7.  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Variable Billions of 2000 Dollars 
Outputs Case 1 Case 1a Case 1b Case 2 Case 2a 
Total Economic Losses 
     (Standard Deviation) 
3580 
(603) 
3266 
(444) 
3894 
(581) 
3575 
(557) 
3576 
(570) 
Total Wealth Transfer 
     (Standard Deviation) 
1312 
(112) 
1312 
(111) 
1312 
(112) 
1312 
(49) 
1312 
(77) 
Total Potential GDP Losses 
     (Standard Deviation) 
1042 
(267) 
1040 
(267) 
1041 
(268) 
1035 
(228) 
1037 
(234) 
Total Macroeconomic Adjustment 
Losses     (Standard Deviation) 
1227 
(503) 
914 
(286) 
1541 
(476) 
1227 
(504) 
1226 
(501) 
   
Inputs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Macroeconomic Adjustment Costs   
     Oil Price Elasticity of GDP -0.055 0.014 
     Macroeconomic Adjustment Share of GDP Elasticity 0.75 0.06 
     1st Year Macroeconomic Impact Related to 2nd 0.55 0.04 
     Macroeconomic Cost Adjustment Rate 0.333 0.045 
     Constant or Share-dependent Elasticity(1) 0.5 0.5 
Potential GDP Losses   
     U.S. Oil Demand Elasticity -0.06 0.008 
     U.S. Oil Demand Adjustment Rate 0.15 0.04 
     U.S. Oil Supply Elasticity 0.05 0.008 
     U.S. Oil Supply Adjustment Rate 0.15 0.04 
     Consumer/Producer Surplus Multiplier 2.25 0.31 
Oil Price Parameters   
     Competitive Market Oil Price(2) 13.00 1.22 
     Oil Price Drift(3) -0.00 0.04 
     Stochastic Price Error Correlation(4) 0.25 0.06 
 
(1)Constant in Cases 1a and 1b 
(2)Constant in Cases 2 and 2a 
(3)Constant in all cases except 2a 
(4)Constant in Cases 1, 1a, and 1b 
 
Of lesser importance but still significant are the elasticities of oil supply and demand, and the 
associated rates of adjustment.  Interestingly, the rates of adjustment seem to be somewhat more 
important than the elasticities themselves.  Of somewhat less significance is the fraction of the 
overall oil price elasticity of GDP that is assigned to macroeconomic adjustment costs versus 
potential GDP loss.  Changing that fraction from 0.75 to 0.6 would reduce estimated total costs 
by about $250 billion. 
 
Each of the three cost components also has a distribution and can be subjected to sensitivity 
analysis.  Macroeconomic adjustment costs have a mean of $1.2 trillion and a 90% simulation 
interval of $0.6 to $2.2 trillion.  The distribution is skewed to the right, with some cost estimates 
exceeding $3 trillion (Figure 12). 
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Macroeconomic Adjustment Costs: Case 1
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Figure 12.  Frequency Distribution of Macroeconomic Adjustment Costs: Case 1 
 
Macroeconomic adjustments costs are sensitive to only a few factors: (1) the oil price elasticity 
of GDP, (2) whether that elasticity is constant or varies with the oil cost share, (3) the rate of 
adjustment to oil price shocks, and (4) the fraction of the total GDP elasticity ascribed to 
macroeconomic adjustment costs (Figure 13).  Because losses of potential GDP are estimated by 
areas under the oil supply and demand curves, the oil price elasticity of GDP affects only 
macroeconomic adjustment costs. 
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Figure 13.  Sensitivity Analysis for Macroeconomic Adjustment Costs: Case 1 
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Total estimated losses of potential GDP are about the same magnitude as macroeconomic 
adjustment costs on average ($1.0 trillion) but are somewhat less variable.  The 90% simulation 
interval runs from $0.7 to $1.5 trillion and is also skewed to the right (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14.  Frequency Distribution of Potential GDP Losses: Case 1 
 
Potential GDP loss estimates are sensitive to the multiplier relating consumer and producer 
surplus losses in the oil market to economy-wide surplus losses, the assumed competitive market 
price of oil, the elasticities of U.S. oil demand and supply, and the rate of adjustment of the 
economy to oil price changes (Figure 15). Particularly interesting is the importance of adjustment 
rates.  How fast the capital stock of energy using equipment can be turned over, how quickly oil 
supply can be expanded when prices rise all are important determinants of losses.  An increase in 
the adjustment rate parameter (λ) implies an increase in the rate of adjustment.  For a given 
short-run demand elasticity this implies a smaller long-run price elasticity.  Decreasing the 
elasticities of demand or supply decreases the size of the surplus losses.  Thus, slowing down the 
rates of adjustment of supply and demand appears to increase the estimated costs of oil 
dependence, but the real effect occurs via the increased long-run price elasticities. Because the 
elasticity of demand is negative and the elasticity of supply is positive, making either more 
elastic (increasing its absolute value) increases costs.  Demand parameters are more important 
than supply parameters because the United States consumes roughly twice the petroleum it 
supplies. 
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Figure 15.  Sensitivity Analysis for Potential GDP Losses: Case 1 
 
The distribution of wealth transfer costs is striking because is varies so little.  With a mean value 
of $1.3 trillion, the 90% simulation interval is $1.1 to $1.5 trillion (Figure 16).  The tornado chart 
shows clearly why: wealth transfer costs depend on the assumed competitive price of oil and 
nothing else (Figure 17).  The other apparent correlations are due to the randomness of the 
simulations and are not significant. 
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Total Wealth Transfer: Case 1
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Figure 16.  Frequency Distribution for Wealth Transfer Costs: Case 1 
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Figure 17.  Sensitivity Analysis of Wealth Transfer Costs: Case 1 
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5.2  CASE 1A: OIL PRICE ELASTICITY OF GDP VARIES WITH OIL COST SHARE 
 
This variant of the reference Case 1 requires the oil price elasticity of GDP to vary in proportion 
to the oil cost share of GDP in all simulations.  The oil price elasticity parameter assumed is to 
apply to the year 1984, when oil expenditures as a share of GDP were near historic highs (see 
Figure 9).  The effect of scaling the elasticity by oil expenditures relative to GDP is to reduce the 
estimated costs, especially in recent years.  The resulting mean estimated total cost is $3.3 trillion 
compared with $3.7 trillion in Case 1 (Figure 18).  Effectively reducing the oil price elasticity of 
GDP makes the competitive price of oil the most important determinant of the total costs of oil 
dependence in Case 1a (Figure 19).  In general, other parameters determining the 
macroeconomic adjustment costs also become less important. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Frequency Distribution of Total Costs of Oil Dependence: Case 1a 
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Tornado Chart for Total Economic Losses: Case 1a
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Figure 19.  Sensitivity Analysis of Total Costs: Case 1a 
 
 
5.3  CASE 1B: OIL PRICE ELASTICITY OF GDP CONSTANT OVER TIME 
 
On the other hand, if the oil price elasticity of GDP is assumed to remain constant over time (it 
will still vary from one simulation to another), estimated total costs increase by about $600 
billion in comparison to the varying elasticity Case 1a.  The mean total cost estimate is $3.9 
trillion, with a 90% simulation interval of $3.0 to $4.9 trillion (Figure 20).  Not surprisingly, the 
oil price elasticity of GDP becomes the most critical parameter and all other parameters related 
to macroeconomic adjustment costs increase in importance (Figure 21). 
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Total Economic Losses: Case 1b
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Figure 20.  Frequency Distribution of Total Costs of Oil Dependence: Case 1b 
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Figure 21.  Sensitivity Analysis of Total Costs: Case 1b 
 
 39 
5.4  CASE 2: STOCHASTIC COMPETITIVE PRICE PATHS WITHOUT DRIFT 
 
Case 2 considers the possibility that a time-varying path for competitive oil prices might change 
the mean or variance of the estimated costs.  Case 2 simulates random price paths without drift, 
while Case 2a include a deterministic drift parameter that is itself a random variable.  As 
expected, random price paths have little or no effect on average cost estimates.  The mean total 
cost estimate for Case 2 is $3.575 trillion while that for Case 1 is $3.580 trillion, a trivial 
difference (Figure 22).  Even the 90% simulation ranges are very close, implying that the net 
effect of truly random price fluctuations on the estimated costs of oil dependence and also their 
variance is essentially nil.  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the random price model does not show up in the sensitivity analysis as having a 
significant impact (Figure 23).  Although this result may seem obvious in retrospect, it is 
important because it implies that comparison to a constant average competitive market price can 
give reliable results provided there is no trend in the mean competitive price over time. 
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Figure 22.  Frequency Distribution of Total Costs of Oil Dependence: Case 2 
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Tornado Chart for Total Economic Losses: Case 2
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Figure 23.  Sensitivity Analysis of Total Costs: Case 2 
 
 
5.5   CASE 2A: STOCHASTIC COMPETITIVE PRICE PATHS WITH                 
DETERMINISTIC DRIFT 
 
Case 2a considers the impact of deterministic price “drift”, represented by a linear trend in the 
mean of the random competitive price series.  The competitive price still fluctuates randomly 
over time, but about a trending mean rather than a constant mean as in Case 2.  The mean 
competitive price trends gradually from $13/bbl in 1973 towards a new level in 2004 somewhere 
between $16/bb and $10/bbl.  Once again, this has little effect on the mean total cost estimate, 
here $3.6 trillion, essentially no different from Case 1 or Case 2 (Figure 24).  The range of cost 
estimates is also similar but just a bit narrower.  This narrower range reflects the fact that in Case 
2 the mean price level varies between $10 and $16 and is the same for all years.  In Case 2a the 
mean varies between $10 and $16 in 2004, but varies less in intervening years, always beginning 
at $13/bbl in 1973.  
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Total Economic Losses: Case 2a
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Figure 24.  Frequency Distribution of Total Costs of Oil Dependence: Case 2a 
 
The competitive price drift parameter appears in fourth place in the sensitivity analysis.  One 
standard deviation of the drift parameter is 0.04; approximately 2.5 standard deviations is the 
difference between a mean price of $16 in 2004 versus $13.  According to the sensitivity 
coefficient for drift, an increase of 2.5 standard deviations would decrease the total cost estimate 
by 0.5 standard deviations or about $300 billion, since one standard deviation of the total cost 
distribution is about $603 billion (Figure 25).  This result implies that even very significant time 
trends in the competitive market price of oil would change the total cost estimate by less than 
10%.  The robustness of the estimates to both trends and random fluctuations in the hypothetical 
competitive market price of oil suggests that the general magnitude of the total cost estimates is 
reliable. 
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Tornado Chart for Total Economic Losses: Case 2a
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Figure 25.  Sensitivity Analysis of Total Costs: Case 2a 
 
Most of the influence of the competitive price of oil on the total costs of oil dependence comes 
via its impact on the transfer of wealth, for which it is the only important assumption 
(normalized regression coefficient of -0.9 and no other parameter has a statistically significant 
coefficient). 
 
 
5.6  THE IMPACT OF CONTINUED HIGH OIL PRICES IN 2005 
 
Oil prices surged to over $50/bbl in 2004.  The spot market price of Brent crude oil increased 
from $31/bbl in January and February to $50.50/bbl during the third week of October.  Prices 
moderated somewhat in November, remaining within the range of $40-45/bbl for most of the 
month.  As a result, the average refiner acquisition price of crude oil in 2004 was approximately 
$37.50/bbl.  What the price of oil will be for 2005 is, of course, highly uncertain.  The Energy 
Information Administration’s February 2005 Short Term Energy Outlook foresees high oil prices 
throughout 2005. 
 
“The projected average West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price for the 
first quarter of 2005 is about $46.70 per barrel, approximately $11 per barrel 
higher than in the first quarter of 2004 and $3 per barrel above the first quarter 
projection in the previous Outlook.  EIA projects that WTI prices are likely to 
remain in the low- to mid-$40’s per barrel range throughout 2005-2006.  
However, oil prices are likely to be sensitive to any incremental supply tightness 
that appears during periods of peak demand worldwide.”  (US DOE/EIA, 2005, 
2/9) 
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WTI crude trades at a premium in comparison to the average barrel of imported oil.  EIA projects 
that the average cost of crude to U.S. refiners will be $39.13 (nominal dollars) per barrel in 2005, 
falling slightly to $37/bbl in 2006 (US DOE/EIA, 2005, table HL1). 
 
The following projections assume that the macroeconomic adjustment cost oil price elasticity of 
GDP is proportional to oil costs as a share of GDP.  If oil prices in 2005 were to fall back to the 
2004 average of $39.13/bbl, ($35.51 in constant 2000 dollars) the costs to the U.S. economy of 
oil dependence would increase in 2005 to approximately $175 billion (Figure 26).  The increase 
in costs over 2004 despite a modest increase in price is a reflection of the lag in the impact of oil 
prices on the economy.  If U.S. GDP increases to $11 trillion in 2005, oil dependence costs of 
$175 billion would amount to 1.6% of GDP, not the highest level on record but a very significant 
negative economic impact.  The above estimates assume that the sensitivity of the economy to oil 
price shocks has decreased over time in proportion to the expenditures on oil as a share of GDP.  
If one assumes that the oil price elasticity of GDP has remained constant at -0.055, the costs of 
oil dependence in 2005 would be approximately $220 billion assuming an average price of 
imported oil of $35.50/bbl (constant 2000 dollars).  
 
However, if the price of imported oil were to rise to just over $50/bbl ($50.15/bbl or $45.50 in 
constant 2000 dollars) the costs of oil dependence in 2005 will reach $250 billion (Figure 27).  In 
constant dollars this approaches the peak year for estimated economic impact, 1981, but is just 
over 2% of projected GDP for 2005.   
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Figure 26.  Costs of Oil Dependence to the U.S. Economy 
2005 Losses Projected for $37.50/bbl Oil 
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Figure 27.  Costs of Oil Dependence to the U.S. Economy 
2005 Losses Projected for $47.50/bbl Oil 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1  COSTS OF OIL DEPENDENCE AND TRENDS 
 
The costs to the U.S. economy of oil dependence have been large.  Our 2000 study estimated the 
sum of costs from 1970-2000 at $3.5 trillion in constant 2000 dollars, or $7.3 trillion when 
adjusted to present value (Greene and Tishchishyna, 2001).  This study’s reference case 
estimated total costs at $3.6 trillion through 2004 in constant 2000 dollars, or $8 trillion adjusted 
to present value.  The new method of estimating potential GDP costs and updated parameter 
values used in this study produces somewhat lower estimates than the method used in our 2000 
study, so the numbers are not precisely comparable.   
 
Relative to the size of the economy, oil dependence is perhaps half as important as it was in 
1980.  In constant dollars, however, the costs to the U.S. are roughly the same.  After more than 
a decade of relatively low and decreasing costs of oil dependence, constant dollar impacts on the 
U.S. economy have returned to levels not seen since the early 1980s.  If oil prices continue 
through 2005 at current levels oil dependence will cost the U.S. economy over $200 billion in 
2005.  In constant dollars, this is close to the costs suffered in 1980 and 1981.  As a percent of 
GDP, however, the 2005 impact will be only half as large as the 1980-81 impacts because GDP 
has doubled in the intervening years.   
 
A thorough sensitivity analysis of the oil dependence cost estimates has been carried out by 
means of Monte Carlo simulation.  The analysis shows that while the choices made for several 
key parameters have a significant impact, the costs of oil dependence since 1970 almost certainly 
exceed $2.7 trillion constant 2000 dollars by any reasonable choice of parameters, and could be 
as large as $4.7 trillion.  This is a considerably narrower range of uncertainty than that reported 
in our 2000 study, $1.7 to $7.1 trillion, and reflects the superiority of Monte Carlo based 
sensitivity analysis versus “worst case/best case” scenario analysis. 
 
This analysis also confirms that the three components of oil dependence costs (wealth transfer, 
potential GDP loss, and macroeconomic adjustment costs) are approximately equal in size.  
Thus, focusing on the costs of oil price shocks alone and ignoring wealth transfer and the 
persisting effects of high oil prices on potential GDP losses would underestimate the true costs of 
oil dependence by about a factor of 3. 
 
 
6.2  LIMITATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This analysis has several important limitations.  First, it is based on a simulation using elasticities 
to estimate macroeconomic costs and demand and supply curves plus an indirect impact 
multiplier to estimate losses of potential GDP.  This approach has the advantages of simplicity 
and of allowing consensus parameters from the literature to be used, but it has the disadvantage 
of not explicitly representing the much greater number of market interactions incorporated in 
integrated macroeconomic models.  Second, no one will ever know what path oil prices would 
have followed had there been no OPEC.  This has been partly addressed through Monte Carlo 
simulations but important issues remain.  For example, had there been no OPEC and market 
prices had remained low throughout the 1980s, would there have been the same important 
 46 
technological innovations in oil exploration and development (e.g., 3-D seismic imaging and 
intelligent, directional drilling)?  Would faster rates of production at lower prices have led to a 
trend of rising oil prices over time or instead, without OPEC, would oil have followed the path of 
so many mineral resources whose prices have declined over time? 
 
Many of the limitations of this analysis have to do with uncertainty about the correct values of 
key parameters.  Examples noted above include (1) whether the oil price elasticity of GDP has 
been constant over time or varies with the importance of oil to the economy, (2) what is the 
correct division of GDP losses between macroeconomic and potential GDP losses, (3) what is 
the correct multiplier to translate oil market surplus losses into surplus losses throughout the 
economy, and (4) what are the correct values for supply and demand elasticities and adjustment 
rates?  These issues can be only partially addressed by means of sensitivity analysis.  Further, 
detailed research on the impacts of oil prices on the economy could help refine these 
assumptions.   
 
Finally, the estimates presented here reflect only the direct economic costs of oil dependence.  
Military, strategic and political costs as well as indirect costs (such as the SPR) have not been 
estimated here and they are undoubtedly very large indeed.  
 
Despite these caveats, this analysis has confirmed that oil dependence was and now is once again 
an enormous economic problem for the United States. 
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